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ABSTRACT
Protective  decisions  are  often  puzzling.  Among  other  anomalies,  people  insure  against
non-catastrophic events, underinsure against catastrophic risks, and allow extraneous factors to
influence insurance purchases and other protective decisions. Neither expected utility theory nor
prospect theory can explain these anomalies satisfactorily. We propose a constructed-choice model
for general decision making. The model departs from utility theory and prospect theory in its
treatment of multiple goals and it suggests several different ways in which context can affect choice.
To apply this model to the above anomalies, we consider many different insurance-related goals,
organized in a taxonomy, and we consider the effects of context on goals, resources, plans and
decision rules. The paper concludes by suggesting some prescriptions for improving individual
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GOALS AND PLANS IN PROTECTIVE DECISION MAKING
David H. Krantz and Howard C. Kunreuther
1. Introduction
Many insurance-related decisions appear, at ﬁrst glance, to be suboptimal. For example,
many people pay added premiums that seem excessive to obtain automobile collision insurance
with a low deductible.  To make matters worse, some decide not to ﬁle a claim following a small
accident whose cost could largely be reimbursed via this low deductible1: they fear that a claim
would lead to increased premiums in the next and succeeding years.
A rather  different  example  emerged  after  the  passage  of  the  National  Flood  Insurance
Program in 1968. Insurance coverage against water damage from ﬂooding was offered both to
homeowners and to commercial enterprises in high hazard areas at subsidized low rates.  Yet
there was limited interest in purchasing this coverage despite the subsidy and despite the potential
for catastrophic losses (Kunreuther, 1978).
As  a  third  example,  many people  are  prepared  to  pay  considerably  more  to  insure
possessions that they ﬁnd very attractive than to insure possessions toward which they feel neutral
or negative (Hsee and Kunreuther, 2000).  If such a possession is needed, then it must be replaced
after loss or damage. The replacement cost remains the same, independent of one’s positive or
negative feelings toward the object. Therefore the insurance offers exactly the same ﬁnancial
beneﬁt, independent of feelings, and it is hard to ﬁnd a ﬁnancial reason to pay more for insuring
the attractive object.
Types of anomaly
Three broad classes of insurance anomaly that we consider in this paper are illustrated by
the above examples.  One class of anomalous behavior is insuring against a non-catastrophic loss.
A second type is underinsuring against a truly catastrophic loss. The third category is considering
factors that have little or nothing to do with magnitudes or probabilities of ﬁnancial loss when
making insurance-purchase decisions.
(1) Insuring against non-catastrophic losses
Many insurance contracts have a "deductible" amount whereby only losses in excess of that
amount  will  be  reimbursed.  Thus, with  a  $200  deductible,  a  $900  loss  will  result  in  a
reimbursement of $700, a $300 loss will yield only $100, and a $100 loss will not be reimbursed
at all. Usually, the additional premium for a low deductible is set high enough so that the insurer
has a positive expected value; thus, the insurance purchaser must have a neg  ative expected value.
On  the  average,  individuals  lose  money by purchasing  insurance  with  low rather  than  high
deductibles.  Nonetheless, low deductibles are popular, and a common strategy is to purchase the
lowest possible deductible (Kunreuther & Pauly, 2006).  A number of years ago the Insurance
Commissioner of Pennsylvania, Herbert Denenberg, mandated at least a $100 deductible (rather
than a $50 deductible) for automobile collision policies. Although the plan purportedly saved
consumers millions of dollars it was opposed by the public and had to be rescinded (Cummins, et
al., 1974).
Apart from seeking low deductibles, people insure against other non-catastrophic losses:
1. The term "pseudodeductible" was introduced by Braun, Bradlow, Fader and Kunreuther, 2005, referring to a low deductible that
is paid for but not used when it could be.Goals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 2
they may insure mailed packages with only modest monetary value, or may purchase insurance to
cover replacement of a lost contact lens. If one insures against many non-catastrophic losses, one
is nearly certain to come out behind ﬁnancially, as compared with a strategy of not insuring
against any of those losses. This follows from the law of large numbers, together with fact that the
insurance  contracts  have  neg  ative  expected  value.  One  can  summarize  by  saying  that  people
should self-insure against non-catastrophic losses, but they fail to do so.
(2) Underinsuring against truly catastrophic losses
Many people fail to purchase protection against low-probability high-impact events unless
they are  required  to  do  so. Examples  are  the  ﬁnancial  catastrophes  that  can  arise  from  a
destructive earthquake or ﬂood, from a prolonged major illness, or from a large adverse civil
judgment.  For such events, the pool of individuals at risk is often large.  Therefore, although the
probability is low for each, some people will inevitably be victims. For those who are affected,
the ﬁnancial protection from insurance can make the difference between recovery of one’s life
pattern after the negative event, versus very deep and continuing difﬁculties. Since the risk pool is
large, the ﬁnancial risk can be spread widely, and therefore the cost of insurance for each person
can be relatively low compared to the potential for a catastrophic loss should an untoward event
occur. In some  cases,  subsidies  for  insurance  spread  the  cost  even more  widely, e.g.,  to  all
taxpayers.  Failure  to  budget  moderate  amounts  to  protect  against  such  ﬁnancial  catastrophe
seems imprudent.
(3) Sensitivity to "extraneous" factors
We group together here behavioral phenomena in which insurance purchase is inﬂuenced
by factors that are irrelevant or extraneous, in the sense that they do not affect the ﬁnancial
beneﬁts of insurance, its monetary cost, or the probability of an adverse event.  Factors that are
often (but not always) extraneous, in this sense, include: (i) the positive or neg  ative affect attached
to an object or event; (ii) recent experience of events such as ﬂooding; (iii) what friends and
relatives hav  e decided to do; and (iv) minor transaction costs.
Psychological explanations for anomalies
Below, we consider a variety of explanations.  Here, we focus just on two: extra-ﬁnancial
goals and context effects. Individuals consider multiple goals, not just ﬁnancial ones in making
insurance decisions. As a result of these multiple goals people may purchase insurance that
appears to be unattractive from a ﬁnancial point of view but satisﬁes other needs. In particular
contexts, the salience of some goals may be very high or very low; if one attends only to goals
that are currently very salient, one may purchase insurance that is not really needed or neglect
protective measures that are needed.
Consider the example of ﬂight insurance, which typically costs $5 to $10 per $100,000 of
coverage.  By contrast, a general accidental death insurance policy that offers $500,000 for death
in any common-carrier accident (including commercial airplane ﬂights), plus many other beneﬁts
(injury, automobile accident, etc.) can be obtained for about $12 per month for one person. Thus,
coverage  for  $500,000  for  a  single  airplane  ﬂight  is  much  cheaper  if  one  gets  the  general
insurance policy for a full month, rather than insurance for a speciﬁc ﬂight. However, purchasing
ﬂight insurance at the airport may, for some people, provide "peace of mind" and for the purpose
of such anxiety reduction it may be preferred to drinking alcohol at an airport bar. Alternatively,
a person might make the purchase to demonstrate that she cares for her loved ones.  Such extra-
ﬁnancial goals might make the ﬂight insurance worth the cost.
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in view of these extra-ﬁnancial goals. The latter goals are made salient in the airport context;
ﬂight insurance would probably be much less popular if it were sold at the local grocery store.
Someone who thinks about the risks of air travel in a broader temporal frame might well choose
to purchase general accident insurance, and might achieve peace of mind just by recalling, at the
time of any single ﬂight, that she is insured.
The  paper  is  organized  in  the  following  manner. The  next  section  discusses  ways  of
incorporating multiple goals into quantitative models of choice: we contrast a standard utility
maximization framework with a model of constructed choice, and argue that the latter offers
several advantages.  Section 3 presents a taxonomy of insurance-related goals. Section 4 uses this
classiﬁcation  to  help  explain  anomalies,  such  as  those  noted  above, in ways  that  differ
substantially from the expected-utility framework and from prospect theory. The paper concludes
with a set of prescriptive implications of a model of protective activities based on multiple goals
and constructed choice.
2.  Goal-based Models of Choice
Most plans are designed to achieve multiple goals; and protective plans are no exception.
For example, a plan to purchase ﬁre and theft insurance (on a home, say, or on the contents of a
rented apartment) may be designed to satisfy as many as sev  en goals simultaneously: (i) reducing
the chances of a catastrophic loss, (ii) reducing anxiety about risks of ﬁre and theft, (iii) avoiding
regret and/or providing consolation in case a loss occurs, (iv) satisfying requirements stated by a
bank or by a landlord, (v) presenting the appearance of prudence to others who will learn about
the  insurance  purchase,  (vi)  maintaining  ones  relationship  with  an  insurance  agent,  and  (vii)
avoiding  highly  burdensome  insurance  premium  payments. The  importance  of  these  goals
obviously varies with the decision maker, but may also be affected temporarily by contextual
variables.  Someone grappling with the problem of keeping monthly payments affordable may, in
that context, think only about two goals: satisfying the risk-reduction requirements of the bank
that holds the mortgage loan (goal iv above), and minimizing the cost of insurance (goal vii). If
the same person has just inherited valuable works of art, she may think chieﬂy about reducing
anxiety (goal ii) and avoiding regret (goal iv).
There  is  a  subtle  and  important  question  about  how such  multiple  goals  should  be
represented in theories of human decision making and in prescriptive principles aimed at better
decisions.  If goals  are  viewed  as  stable,  then  tradeoffs  among  different  goals  may  well  be
represented  by  a  multi-attribute  utility  function. Decision  making  can  then  be  viewed  as  an
attempt  to  maximize  expected  multi-attribute  utility—albeit  limited  by  bounds  on  human
knowledge and abilities. In this framework there is nothing counternormative about including
non-ﬁnancial goals in the utility function. If, on the other hand, context strongly inﬂuences what
goals are considered and how they are traded off, then it may be impossible to view decision
making as an attempt to maximize multi-attribute utility. A "utility function" would be context
dependent, and indeed, might vary with the set of options available to the decision maker (which
form part of the context).  The description of human decision making might focus on what goals
are  considered  at  all,  rather  than  about  stable  trade-offs  among  different  attributes.  A
constr  ucted choice that is heavily based on some particular goal might be viewed as suboptimal,
if that goal turns out to get little or no weight in other contexts encountered by the decision
maker.
The idea that preferences are constr  ucted, rather than revealed, emerged from many lines
of research in the late 1980s and early 1990s (e.g., Tversky,  Sattath & Slovic, 1988, Tversky,
Slovic & Kahneman, 1990, Chapman & Johnson, 1995) and was well characterized by SlovicGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 4
(1995).  This idea is more or less taken for granted in current psychological work on decision
making (e.g., Sedikides, Ariely & Olsen,1999; Zhang & Markman, 2001). In order to apply the
idea systematically to protective decision making with multiple goals, and in order to consider its
prescriptive implications, it seems necessary to develop a model of context-dependent choice that
runs  as  parallel  as  possible  to  the  theory  of  expected  utility. We do this  in  the  next  two
subsections.
Multiple goals and utility maximization
In traditional decision theory, a choice among several alternative plans, each with multiple
goals, is usually cast in the framework of multi-attribute utility theory (Debreu, 1960; Krantz,
Luce, Suppes & Tversky, 1971; Keeney & Raiffa, 1976).  To incorporate uncertainty, a decision
problem is often represented as a matrix (Savage, 1954): the rows represent possible actions or
strategies for the decision maker, the columns represent possible events that could occur, and the
entry  in  any cell  of  the  matrix  (any giv  en strategy-event  combination)  is  a  multi-attribute
outcome, composed of all goals that will be achieved if that particular strategy is selected by the
decision maker and that particular event happens to occur.
Table 1 depicts aspects of this model in an abstract form and indicates how the model is
used for measurement and decision making. The columns in Table 1 are a partition of possible
ev  ents.  The notation oij for the cell entries conceals the complications associated with evaluating
outcomes consisting of multiple attributes.  (See Keeney and Raiffa 1976 for a detailed discussion
of this point.) The selected strategy is one that maximizes expected utility. The expected utility
equation, shown at the bottom of Table 1, serves as the basis for measurement of outcome utilities
uij and subjective probabilities p j.
Table 1: General strategy/event structure
for decision making under uncertainty
matr  ix entr  ies are outcomes for different strategies, conditional on events
Possible  Possible Events (mutually exclusive and exhaustive)
Strategies
E1 E2 ... En
strategy 1 o11 o12 ... o1n
strategy 2 o21 o22 ... o2n
...  ...
strategy m om1 om2 ... omn
ev  ents have subjective probabilities p j = prob(E j)
outcomes have subjective values uij = value(oij)
uij may be integrated across multiple attributes of oij
multi-attr  ibute utility is integrated across uncertain events
U(strategy i) =
n
j=1   p j uijGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 5
This framework can be used for measurement of p j and uij, assuming the functional forms for
multi-attribute utility and expectation (Savage, 1954; Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky,  1971;
Koebberling & Wakker, 2004).  Alternatively, giv  en values of p j and uij, the model can be used
to ﬁnd the strategy that maximizes expected utility and thus aid complex decisions.
There  is  a  vast  literature  devoted  to  commentary  on  this  subjective  expected  (multi-
attribute) utility (SEMAUT) framework.  We make no attempt to summarize the debates about
SEMAUT, but we note three points, for purpose of contrast with the framework developed in the
next subsection.
First, the SEMAUT mechanism entails that choices are transitive, because the ordering of
U(strategy)  is  a  numeric  ordering. Transitivity  is  often  viewed  as  the  most  fundamental  of
normative principles of choice, but it is violated systematically and predictably by at least two
quite  different  and  commonly  used  choice  mechanisms:  majority  voting  in  social  choice
(Condorcet,  1785;  Arrow,  1951)  and  additive  combination  of  within-attribute  differences
(Tversky, 1969).  Moreover, transitivity of pairwise choice can easily be violated through context-
dependent decisions: a decision maker can choose option A over option B in one context, and B
over C in a second context, and yet choose C over A in a third context.  We return later to the
various  ways  in  which  transitivity  fails  for  individual  decision  making,  and  suggest  that
alternative  decision  rules,  which  permit  intransitivity, can  be  used  without  violating  any
compelling normative principle.
Second, the SEMAUT framework demands rather complex utility measurements for the
conjunctions of different goals that are bundled together within one outcome oij. Multi-attribute
utility may be hard to measure for the mixture of goals that are involved in protective decision
making.  We illustrate this point by an example (Table 2), in which the framework of Table 1 is
instantiated for a simpliﬁed version of a decision concerning ﬂood insurance. Table 2 gives a
strategy/event matrix with only two strategies and four events.  We achieve this simpliﬁcation by
assuming that only one insurance policy is available, thus the only two strategies are to purchase
insurance or not. Each row of the matrix is wide enough to encompass several different outcome
components  (ﬁnancial  cost,  hassles,  various  feelings)  listed  as  subheadings. The  columns
distinguish four events: E1, no ﬂood; E2, a ﬂood in which one manages to avoid major property
damage; E3, a ﬂood that leads to major property damage; and E4, a destructive ﬂood that causes
catastrophic property damage. We  treat E1 through E4 as mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
For concreteness we assume that these four events have respective annual probabilities 85%, 9%,
4%, and 2%. Such probabilities could be the output of an elaborate scientiﬁc model, or might
represent  the  decision  maker’s best  (subjective) judgment.  The utility  assigned  to  a  speciﬁc
outcome would depend on the levels of the components, i.e., the level of ﬁnancial cost, hassles,
anxiety, etc.Goals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 6
Table 2: Strategy/event matrix for purchase of ﬂood insurance
Events
E1 E2 E3 E4
ﬂood causes damaging  destructive
little damage ﬂood  ﬂood ev  ent description no ﬂood




ﬁnancial cost premium  premium premium  premium
hassles  none minor  major great
chronic ﬂood-related anxiety none  none none  none
acute anxiety (at ﬂood) none  little little  little




ﬁnancial cost none  small large  catastrophic
hassles  none minor  major great
chronic ﬂood-related anxiety some  some some  some
acute anxiety (at ﬂood) none  much much  much
other feelings justiﬁcation  relief  major regret  vast regret
To use this matrix as a decision support tool, one would need to evaluate subjectively some
rather  complicated  conjunctions  of  consequences:  for  example,  if  one  does  not  purchase
insurance, and there is a damaging ﬂood (E3), how will one feel about having suffered some
long-term anxiety about a possible ﬂood, then acute anxiety as the waters rise, coupled with
major hassles, major regret at not being insured, and large ﬁnancial losses? Does it make sense to
evaluate  each  of  these  disutilities  separately  and  then  just  add  them  up  numerically, before
multiplying by the 4% probability of E3? The validity of such a procedure would not be obvious,
but what are the appealing alternatives?
Putting goals ﬁrst: To w ard a theory of context-dependent choice
The same ﬂood-insurance decision can be represented by a rather different sort of matrix, in
which the rows have similar meaning but the columns are speciﬁed by the goals that might enterGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 7
into the decision process2. We call the rows plans, rather than strategies (for reasons that will be
discussed below), and call this representation a plan/goal matrix.
Table 3: Plan/goal matrix for purchase of ﬂood insurance
Goals
feel  avoid avoid  avoid avoid  avoid avoid  avoid
Plans small  major catastrophic  chronic acute  major vast
loss  loss loss  anxiety anxiety  regret  regret justiﬁed
plan 1:
purchase .15  0 1 1  1 mostly  1 1
ﬂood insurance
plan 2: .85  .85 .94  .98 0 .85  .94 .98
no insurance
In Table 3, most of the outcome components shown in Table 2 have been transformed into
goals, especially, losses or emotions to be avoided.  Eight possible goals are shown—not all may
be active or important for a given decision maker. Goals relating to avoidance of hassles could
also be included (they are outcome components in Table 2), but we omit them here because the
hassles, minor or otherwise, are unavoidable if a ﬂood occurs, whether or not one purchases
insurance.  Thus, they are irrelevant to the decision. The rows are narrow in Table 3, because in
this example, the conditions under which a given plan achieves each goal can mostly be stated as
numeric probabilities, by cumulating the event probabilities from Table 2 appropriately.
For example, the decision maker will avoid catastrophic ﬁnancial loss and vast regret, under
the  no-insurance  plan,  provided  that  there  is  no  destructive  ﬂood,  an  event  with  probability
.85+.09+.04 = .98. Note that this cumulation of events relative to a particular goal is akin to
the  formalism  of  cumulative  prospect  theory  (Tversky & Kahneman,  1992),  and  indeed,  the
model we present here is motivated by that theory.
Superﬁcially, the change from Table 2 to Table 3 could be viewed as just a rearrangement.
For example, in Table 2, under strategy 1, the utility of "feel justiﬁed" would be multiplied by
.09+.04+.02 = .15, corresponding to the ﬂood events E2, E3, E4; while in Table 3, under
plan 1, the value of attaining the goal "feel justiﬁed" would again be multiplied by the weight
factor .15. In other words, we are just taking the components of multiattribute utility from Table
2 and turning them into goal values for the columns of Table 3, and we are cumulating the event
probabilities from the columns of Table 2 and inserting them appropriately as matrix entries in
Table 3.
There are several reasons why the change from Table 2 to Table 3 is much more far-
reaching than would be implied by such a rearrangement. Before discussing this change further,
2. Much previous work has been devoted to goals that serve as reference points on a continuum, e.g., aspiration level (Fischer,
Carmon, Ariely & Zauberman, 1999; Heath, Larrick & Wu, 1999; See, Heath & Fox, 2006; Shapira, 1995). The present use of
the goal concept is intended to include such cases, as we discuss further in connection with prospect theory below.  Our concept
is broader, howev  er, and derives from social psychology (Lewin, 1951) and from cognitive theory (Newell, 1990).Goals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 8
we give the more general abstract form of the plan/goal matrix.
Table 4 depicts the plan/goal structure in a manner as close as possible to the strategy/event
structure of Table 1. As already mentioned in connection with Table 3, we let the rows represent
plans rather than strategies, for a reason to be discussed. The major differences from Table 1 are
that here, goals rather than events deﬁne the columns, and the entries in the cells are decision
weights rather than multi-attribute outcomes.
Table 4: General plan/goal structure for decision making
matr  ix entr  ies are decision weights for different goals, conditional on plans
Possible  Active Goals
Plans
G1 G2 ... Gn
plan 1 w11 w12 ... w1n
plan 2 w21 w22 ... w2n
...  ...
plan m wm1 wm2 ... wmn
goals have subjective values v j = v(G j)
plans   decision weights for each goal wij = w(G j | plan i)
plan i is evaluated in terms of the v j and wij .
The plan/goal structure in constructed choice
We will discuss ﬁve differences between the plan/goal structure depicted in Table 4 and the
strategy/event structure given in Table 1 to represent SEMAUT. What emerges overall, however,
is that the different structures suggest different questions to be asked in analyzing a decision
problem.
Our ﬁrst point is seen most easily by contrasting Tables 2 and 3 in the matter of ﬂood
insurance.  The SEMAUT structure incorporates feelings at the cost of asking difﬁcult questions
about utility of multi-attribute outcomes compounded from heterogeneous elements—ﬁnancial
outcomes plus an assortment of different feelings that may arise. The questions may be difﬁcult
because the underlying utilities are ﬁctitious from a psychological viewpoint: people are highly
uncertain about their tradeoffs among such heterogeneous elements. When we put goals ﬁrst, we
drop such artiﬁcial compounds. Of course, there exist natural compound goals. Simple examples
abound: bread-and-butter, butter-or-margarine, etc. Some of the columns of a plan/goal matrix
can  represent  such  natural  conjunctions  or  disjunctions  of goals.  An example  of  a  natural
compound protective goal would be insuring against both water damage and wind damage, in a
coastal zone subject to hurricanes. Unfortunately, insurers are reluctant to offer a simple plan that
achieves this compound; property owners are forced to construct a complex insurance plan forGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 9
this purpose (Kunreuther, 2006).  Our main point is that the plan/goal formalism does not force
one  to  create  extraneous  compounds. Difﬁcult  tradeoffs  among  heterogeneous  goals  are  still
present in the plan/goal setup, but they are taken into consideration at the level of decision rules
for selecting among competing plans, not at the level of basic utility measurement.
Second, the goals considered by the decision maker are context dependent, as are their
subjective values v(G). Context elements, including some of the plans available as options, can
suggest goals that might not otherwise be considered. This is almost standard when one goes to a
new restaurant, reputed to be excellent: the menu offers plans, or components that can be put
together into plans; seeing what is available often leads the diner to adopt a goal that is entirely
novel (ostrich livers in garlic butter) or to change the value v j for an existing goal (e.g., a low-
calorie diet). The same can be true for protective goals: one can adopt a new goal in light of a
protective device offered for sale in a catalog, or in light of an innovative provision offered in an
insurance contract. Valuation of goals can also change with context: for example, a goal toward
which only slight movement seems possible from the available plans, may be downweighted in
importance in the decision process.
An innovative plan may be selected because it seems more likely that an important goal can
be achieved, i.e., the decision weight w for that goal is high, for the plan in question. Here,
however, we are making a different point: it is not merely that the decision weight w is high,
rather, it is the value v for the goal that is changed when the particular plan (or any other context
element)  makes  that  goal  salient. In  the  extreme,  the  goal  might  be  one  that  was  entirely
unknown tothe decision maker before the context made it salient. We discuss this further below,
in relation to Tversky-type intransitivities.
Third, since goals are highlighted in this representation, the uncertain events on which
outcomes depend are relegated to the cells of the matrix. In Tables 3 and 4 we show probabilities
or decision weights in the cells. The thinking underlying the decision weights is hidden entirely
in the matrix representation, but of course it has to be made explicit when one uses this model.
For example, the probabilities in Table 3 are cumulative sums of probabilities for an ordered
series of events.  In other settings, decision weights may arise from subjective support, i.e., the
weighing of evidence (Tversky & Koehler, 1994).  Decision weights may also be affected by poor
timing  in  the  delivery  of  an  outcome  (e.g., untoward  delay)  or  by  incompleteness. This  is
illustrated by the entry "mostly" in Table 3: it is not a probability but a degree of approximation to
a goal, since one may not entirely escape acute anxiety over an impending ﬂood by purchasing
insurance, but one might greatly reduce it.
Fourth,  Table  4  allows,  but  does  not  commit  to  a  sum-of-products  decision  rule. In
contrast, SEMAUT commits to a decision rule that orders strategies on the basis of
U(strategy i) =
n
j=1   p j uij ,
Table 4 merely states that plan i is evaluated in terms of goal values v j and decision weights wij.
Below we discuss three classes of rules that we think play important roles in some types of
decisions, all of them different from a sum-of-products rule. Note also that even if a sum-of-
products rule is used, and is formally identical to the calculation of SEMAUT, because the uij are
additive  multi-attribute  utilities  and  the wij are  sums  of  atomic  probabilities,  the  plan/goal
framework is not equivalent to SEMAUT because the v j can change with context.  Among other
things, such context-dependence allows intransitivity of pairwise choice.
Our  ﬁnal  comment  relates  to  the  substitution  of  "plan"  for  "strategy."  In many cases,
nothing is gained or lost by this change: in non-technical contexts, the two words are more or less
synonyms.  However, strategy already has a technical meaning in game theory, where it refers toGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 10
a choice  element  for  a  game  represented  in  normal  (rather  than  extensive) form.  That is,  a
strategy speciﬁes exactly what the player will do in every circumstance that arises in the course of
playing a game.  This technical meaning is one that we emphatically do not wish to convey: we
view plans as hierarchically organized, containing new decision nodes within them. For example,
a plan to buy insurance would not normally include a speciﬁcation of how to travel from one’s
home or workplace to an insurance agent’s ofﬁce.  If the latter trip becomes necessary, a new
decision process is set in motion to decide how to get there. Similarly, chess players (including
grandmasters) select plans, with room for improvisation; they cannot select strategies, because the
number of branches in the chess tree is much too large to allow even one game-theoretic strategy
to be speciﬁed fully.
Another reason for introducing the term plan is to call attention to the fact that there is a
real  problem  of  level of speciﬁcity  in  the  entire  ﬁeld  of  decision  making. What  is  actually
decided  (consciously  or  unconsciously)  and  what  is  simply  done  pursuant  to  a  plan  already
adopted (with minor parametric adjustments guided by external circumstances)? We confront this
problem by making explicit the assumption that decision making is plan selection. Executing
a plan usually require many actions, but may not require any new decisions.  Sometimes, a plan
leaves open a choice of subplans at some critical juncture, and in that case, there is an additional
decision that has to be made.
The  distinction  between  plan  selection  and  plan  execution  is  related  to  that  between
categorical and continuous perception. We perceive objects on continua (size, distance, weight,
friendliness, etc.) in order to adjust existing plans to reality, but we categorize objects in order to
decide what new plan (or new subordinate plan) should be chosen. For example, one may be
concerned  about  ﬁre  hazard  from  old  papers  in  a  storage  room,  and  may  select  a  plan  that
involves spending an afternoon clearing them out. One has categor  ized the papers as sufﬁciently
hazardous to adopt a goal of greatly reducing the hazard and one selects a plan that has a good
chance of achieving it. When it comes to executing the plan, details will vary depending on a
more continuous perceptual response. If one is over half done after one hour’s work, one begins
to modify the plan so as to make good use of the time gained by ﬁnishing early. Similarly, a plan
to seek insurance may be triggered by categorization of a ﬁnancial risk as too great to ignore, but
the execution of the search plan will vary with countless details.
We choose the word "plan" because it was used similarly by Miller, Galanter and Pribram
(1960) and because it has similar connotations in psychological ﬁelds such as motor performance
and problem solving. We by no means wish to suggest that plans are conscious, or consciously
selected, though of course sometimes they are.
Decision rules and measurement issues
Tw o crucial  questions  about  the  plan/goal  framework  in  Table  4  have  not  yet  been
addressed adequately:
(i) measurement: How can values v j and decision weights wij be measured in practice?
(ii) decision rule: How are these measured values combined when selecting among plans?
Measurement For quantitative  models  of  decision  making,  there  are  two different
approaches to measurement of values or utilities (v j or uij) and decision weights or subjective
probabilities (wij or p j).  We refer to these two approaches as behavioral and psychophysical.
The behavioral approach follows the idea of revealed preference in economics: estimates of
the desired quantities are inferred from an individual’s choices.  This approach has dominated
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Chapters 5 and 8 in Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky (1971).  It has sometimes been used, with
limited  success,  to  estimate  utilities  and  subjective  probabilities  from  laboratory  or  ﬁeld
observations.  Tversky (1967) provided a paradigmatic example; a broad class of later examples
focussed on marketing research is found in the use of "conjoint analysis" (Green & Srinivasan,
1978; Gustafsson, Huber & Hermann, 2001). The second approach emerges from the idea of
"direct" judgment in psychophysics: the requisite quantities are obtained from an individual’s
numerical judgments or comparisons of intervals.  Measurement theories for "direct" judgment of
pairs  (interpreted  as  intervals  or  ratios)  are  discussed  in  Chapter  4  of  Krantz,  et.  al.  (1971).
comparisons or direct "ratio judgment We mention a few of the many examples of the use of
psychophysical methods, mainly tied to the SEMAUT framework: Galanter (1962), Anderson and
Shanteau (1970), Seaver, von Winterfeldt and Edwards (1978), Breault (1983), and Edwards and
von Winterfeldt (1987).
The  behavioral approach requires commitment to a decision rule, a law linking observed
choices  to  underlying  measured  values.  For SEMAUT, the  decision  rule  is  maximization  of
expected utility, as giv  en at the bottom of Table 1. The conditions under which p j and uij can be
consistently measured from observed choices are given in various axiomatizations, e.g., Savage
(1954), Krantz, Luce, Suppes & Tversky (1971), or Koebberling & Wakker (2004a); methods of
measurement  are  implicit  in  the  various  constructive  proofs  of  uniqueness  theorems  for  the
expected-utility representation (Krantz, 1991).
A behavioral  approach  within  the  plan/goal  framework  would  likewise  depend  on
commitment to a decision rule, a speciﬁc linkage between the v j and wij and the choice of a plan.
Our discussion of question (ii), below, suggests that several different decision rules may be used
in  different  contexts.  It therefore  seems  premature  (at  least)  to  axiomatize  behavioral
measurement procedures based on a particular decision rule. Estimating v j and wij based on
psychophysical  judgment,  or, in the  case  of wij, based  on  the  relationship  between  decision
weights  and  probabilities  previously  established  in  the  literature  on  prospect  theory, is less
problematic because it does not assume a decision rule; in fact, such numerical estimates could be
used to test whether a particular decision rule is used in a given context.
Decision rules We now turn to question (ii), decision rules in the plan/goal framework.
We  noted above that a sum-of-products calculation, similar to SEMAUT, is just one of many
combination laws for the v j and the wij that could be considered in models of plan selection.
Three  seem  particularly  interesting:  Tversky’s additive  difference  model,  majority  voting  by
goals, and the class of conjunctive-choice models with thresholds.
We  illustrate  these  three  models  using  a  highly  simpliﬁed  example  of  pairwise  choice
among insurance plans. Consider someone who is choosing among three plans, A, B, C, with
three goals in mind: avoiding catastrophic loss; avoiding regret should a modest loss occur; and
avoiding large premium payments. The three plans are shown as rows and the three goals are the
columns in Table 5. The "decision weights" in the cells are just qualitative entries indicating how
well a given plan satisﬁes a particular goal. Plan A guarantees protection against catastrophic
loss through a high coverage limit. Plan B is the least expensive of the three plans. Plan C has a
lower deductible than the other two plans, so modest losses will not lead to regret—little will be
paid out of pocket.
Table 5 is structured so that for each pair of plans, there is a large, presumably salient
difference with respect to one of the goals, but smaller and opposite differences with respect to
the other two goals.  For example, Plan B is much cheaper than A, but B has a coverage limit
somewhat  lower  than  A  (less  guarantee  against  catastrophic  loss)  and  B  has  a  deductible
somewhat  higher  than  A,  so  there  is  more  chance  of  a  modest  loss  that  will  lead  to  regret.Goals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 12
Similarly, Plan C has a much lower deductible than B but is somewhat worse than B for the other
two goals, and Plan A has a much higher coverage limit than C but is not as attractive with
respect to the remaining goals.
Table 5: Goal conﬂict for three insurance plans
Goals
Insurance
Plans  avoid  avoid  minimize
catastrophic  regretting a up-front
loss  modest loss  costs
excellent  poor
(high limit) (expensive) A OK
poor  excellent
(high deductible)  (cheap) B OK
poor  excellent
(low limit)  (low deductible) C OK
The ﬁrst thing to note is that someone might decide between any two plans by counting the
number of goals that are better satisﬁed by each of them. This is the majority-vote rule for
pairwise choice, applied here to individual rather than social choice, with the individual’s goals as
"voters."  This method may seem perfectly reasonable for any one pairwise choice, but in Table 5,
it leads to the classic Condorcet/Arrow intransitivity, as depicted in Figure 1 (a). The ﬁgure
shows that A > B, B > C, and C > A, each by two goals to one.
INSERT FIGURE 1
Alternatively, one might decide between two plans by evaluating the differences in the
decision weights for each goal using a function that expands large differences relative to small
ones, and then integrating across the goals by adding up the signed differences.  This is a special
case of the additive-difference theory of Tversky (1969).  If the difference between excellent and
OK is taken as one unit and that between OK and poor likewise is one unit, and if one cubes the
differences  (preserving  sign),  then  the  A,  B  difference  reverses: B > A, because  the  cost
difference is worth 23 = 8 units, while the regret and coverage differences are each only  1. In
fact, the whole intransitive cycle is reversed, as shown in Figure 1 (b).
There is strong evidence that, in multi-attribute situations, people tend to make within-
attribute comparisons early and often (Payne, Bettman & Johnson, 1993). This supports the idea
that differences with respect to particular goals are evaluated ﬁrst, and then integrated to make the
choice.  One might  guess  that  vote-counts  would  often  be  used  to  integrate  the  multiple
differences when decision making is deliberative and tradeoffs among different goals are difﬁcult,
whereas something like the Tversky mechanism would often be used where time is short and the
decision maker looks for the most salient difference between two plans.
Finally, a threshold model is one that requires that one or more goals be satisﬁed to some
minimum  degree—the  threshold  is  set  with  respect  to  the  decision  weight. An  insurance
purchaser who considered plans such as those depicted by Table 5 might ﬁrst set a threshold ofFigure 1:  Two bases for intransitivity
(a)  Condorcet cycle
A > B   &   B > C   &   C > A









(b)  Tversky cycle
A < B   &   B < C   &   C < A
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"pretty likely" for the goal "avoid catastrophic loss." This decision-weight threshold for one goal
would  exclude  plan  C  because  of  its  low coverage  limit. This  would  lead  to  an  immediate
decision in the case of two pairwise choices involving C, and in a choice among all three plans, it
would eliminate C, leaving conﬂict between A and B, which might be resolved in favor of A (two
goals to one) or in favor of B (cost being salient). If, instead, the decision weight threshold for
"avoid catastrophic loss" were set at "nearly certain" only plan A could be chosen. A decision-
weight threshold could also be set for each of two goals, e.g., "pretty likely" to avoid catastrophic
loss and also to avoid regret.  This would eliminate plans B and C, leaving A as the only choice.
A decision-weight threshold of "nearly certain" for both those goals would create severe conﬂict,
since none of the plans available satisfy the criterion.
To describe behavior within the plan/goal framework, one must ﬁnd out not about goals and
decision weights, but about the decision mechanism. Prescriptive use of the plan/goal framework
must  consider  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  in  a  given decision  environment  of  various
mechanisms that could be used to select a plan.
Advantages of the plan/goal framework
The overriding difference between the plan/goal and the SEMAUT framework lies in what
questions are asked and answered most naturally.
A strategy/event layout focusses on the uncertain events that determine what outcomes will
occur, giv  en the choice of a particular strategy. Consideration of the decision-maker’s goals is
secondary. Consideration of multiple goals is inhibited, because it requires the evaluation of
complex multi-attribute outcomes for each cell of the strategy/event matrix. A plan/goal layout
focusses ﬁrst on goals, and then, for each goal, on how likely or to what extent each strategy can
achieve that goal.
Plans are generally selected to achieve multiple goals. Since it is easy to think about
each goal, this principle is easy to apply: in analyzing decisions, one tries to encompass all the
goals that might be under consideration, to ask which ones actually are considered and whether
any important goals are not yet included. One also can ask probing questions about each goal: is
it a product of the particular context?  would the decision maker pursue the goal if the context
made it less salient? and are some goals underweighted because of the context?
The plan/goal representation ﬁts well with studies of insurance decisions. In Section 4 we
use it as the basis for systematic discussion of the insurance anomalies surveyed in Section 1.
Here, we give one example of how it might be applied.
People often purchase ﬂood insurance after suffering damage in a ﬂood, then many cancel
their  policies  when  several  consecutive  years  pass  with  no  ﬂood  (Kunreuther, Sanderson  &
Vetschera, 1985). A simple explanation (Table 3) is that avoiding anxiety and feeling justiﬁed are
both important goals. Following ﬂood damage, anxiety is high, and reducing it is salient; it is
also easy to justify buying the insurance, since a ﬂood has just occurred. Thus, plan 1 is selected,
based strongly on "feel justiﬁed" and "avoid anxiety."  After several years, many people may ﬁnd
that the prospect of a ﬂood no longer troubles their "peace of mind" so anxiety avoidance has low
weight.  Meanwhile, they do not feel justiﬁed in continuing to pay premiums and not collecting
on  their  policy;  the  unfulﬁlled  "feel  justiﬁed"  goal  becomes  more  salient. The  differential
weighting of these two goals can lead to selection of the alternate plan. Note that this theory
predicts that a decision maker who puts heavy weight on the goals of avoiding catastrophic costs
and avoiding vast regret will likely continue to purchase ﬂood insurance year after year, if the cost
is modest.
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played  by  feeling  that  insurance  is  unjustiﬁed,  about  the  true  importance  of  having  a  good
justiﬁcation, and about whether protection against catastrophic costs might be a good justiﬁcation
for paying the premium.
A laboratory study (Piao, Kunreuther & Krantz, 2006) provides evidence that insurance
decisions are affected by context and may be rendered suboptimal by salience. Subjects answered
hypothetical questions about several types of protective decision, including purchasing insurance.
One group was asked to state willingness to pay to eliminate a deductible, a second group to state
willingness to pay for increased coverage limits, and a third subgroup chose between eliminating
the  deductible  or  increasing  the  coverage  limit.  For  the  ﬁrst  two subgroups,  distributions  of
willingness to pay (for no deductible or for high coverage) were about equal; but in the choice
situation, a strong majority chose high coverage rather than no deductible. These results suggest
that  people  readily  recognize  the  importance  of  insuring  against  catastrophe  rather  than
purchasing a low deductible when comparing the two situations but otherwise may not consider
the need to protect themselves against these types of events.
Apart from the present application to protective decision making, there are a number of
other advantages of the plan/goal framework.  Detailed discussion of these is beyond the scope of
this paper, but we mention three here.
A decision  is  a  choice  among  two or more  plans. This  idea  is  intended  to  build
connections  between  decision  sciences  and  other  areas  of  cognitive  science.  It offers  a
connections  to  studies  of  planning,  problem-solving,  motor  performance,  automaticity, and
consciousness.  It suggests separate attention to issues of plan construction, plan selection, and
feedback-guided execution of plans. In connection with the latter, it calls attention to cases of
"going  ballistic"  —  acting  (possibly  with  feedback  guidance)  without  further  choice. Not
ev  erything can be chosen, but the presence of subordinate choice points, where subplans are
considered or the current plan is reconsidered, can be an important feature of a plan.
Goals have intr  insic temporal markers. This principle can serve as the basis of a theory
of  intertemporal  choice  that  frees  temporal  planning  from  the  rigidity  of  a  sequence  of
consumption periods, for which future consumption is discounted. A goal may be marked as very
short term (getting out of the path of an oncoming truck), short term, medium term, etc. or in
some cases on-going (maintaining good relations with a friend) or quasiperiodic.
Consideration  of  goals  suggests  a distinction  between  goals  and  resources. Some
people want money (a goal); nearly everyone, however, wants to spend money (a resource) in the
service of other goals. This leads to a consideration of multiple resources and to development of
theories about commitment of resources to plans.
3. Taxonomy of insurance-related goals.
As a general framework for protective decision making, we assume that choice involves
selection of a plan among several alternative options, that most plans are designed to achieve
multiple goals, and that the set of goals to which a plan is directed may or may not be fully
integrated into a single coherent mental representation with a clear evaluative component. Choice
context (which includes the particular set of plans made explicitly available) affects which goals
are considered, what value is placed on each goal, and how each plan is evaluated. Evaluation of a
plan may take into account uncertainty about achieving various goals, the time at which different
goals are likely to be achieved, who is likely to beneﬁt in each case, and what resources are likely
to be needed.
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goals by distinguishing between ﬁve main goal categories: sharing ﬁnancial risk, getting return
from  an  investment,  feeling  good  (or  at  least  not  too  bad),  satisfying  legal or other  ofﬁcial
requirements, and satisfying social and/or cognitive norms.
(1) Financial protection by risk sharing
Insurance can be provided to individuals at relatively low cost, for a negative event that has
high ﬁnancial impact, if the negative event in question has low probability, there are many at risk,
and  occurrences  of  the  event  are  statistically  independent. The  beneﬁt  from  one’s premium
payment is being protected against the risk of a large ﬁnancial loss.
Some  people  may  also  hope  for  ﬁnancial  protection  against  negative  events  that  have
relatively high probabilities and relatively small ﬁnancial impacts. Insuring against the loss of a
contact lens is a well-known example.  In this case, one does expect to make insurance claims and
to  get  reimbursements:  perhaps  many times  during  a  period  of  years.  Such  a  goal  might  be
predicated on the belief—usually, but not always erroneous—that total premium payments, over a
period of years, will be less than total costs from the series of negative events. One believes, in
effect, that the insurer will lose money in the long run. One might also hold this goal without such
a belief, by simply neglecting probability considerations and focusing on the consequences if the
ev  ent occurs. Failing to think about probability and believing that an insurer will lose in the long
run, are usually cognitive errors. There is nothing paradoxical or uncommon about maintaining a
goal on the basis of a wrong belief and/or an error in reasoning.
(2) Beneﬁts of investment
Life  insurance  and  annuity  contracts  sometimes  combine  ﬁnancial  protection  for
beneﬁciaries, in the event of death of the insured person, with various investment beneﬁts such as
capital accumulation and/or regularly received payments. Such contracts are attractive because
people do have such investment goals. Health insurance contracts usually do not accumulate cash
value or pay dividends, but often there are other regular ﬁnancial beneﬁts, such as free or low-cost
annual checkups and discounts on prescription drugs.
The ability to be reimbursed, irregularly but frequently, for small losses may be perceived
as a dividend stream coming from insurance contracts with low deductibles.  The goal of getting
some fairly regular returns can be distinguished from the goal of protection against small losses,
discussed above. For the investment goal, one does not expect a net positive cash ﬂow from the
insurance; one merely expects some kind of cash-back return. In this sense, many individuals
view one of the goals in purchasing an insurance policy as getting a ﬁnancial return on their
investment. Those who do not collect on their policies for several years period feel that their
premiums have been wasted. It is hard to convince them that the best return on an insurance
policy is no return at all.
Consider the case of ﬂood insurance. As pointed out above, many individuals who are not
required to have insurance cancel their coverage if they hav  e not made a claim over the past
several  years  (Kunreuther, Sanderson  &  Vetschera,  1985).  Such  behavior  would  be
understandable  for  people  who  revise  the  probability  of  a  loss  downward  in  the  light  of
experience. Most people respond that the probability and the consequences of a similar event
remain about the same as before and they are generally correct in this view.  Furthermore ﬂood
insurance in the United States has mostly been highly subsidized on existing homes by the federal
government so that the purchase of coverage has positive expected value in addition to protecting
against catastrophic loss. We  hypothesize that it is unpopular because it fails to provide cash-
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(3) Emotion-related goals
There is a growing literature on on how affect and emotional goals impact on individuals
decisions under risk (Loewenstein et al 2001; Finucane et al 2001). Three goals in this category
are reduction of anxiety—"peace of mind", avoidance of anticipated regret and consolation.
We  noted  above  that  for  low-probability, high-impact  events,  the  beneﬁt  from  one’s
premium payment is just being protected against the risk of a large ﬁnancial loss. In addition
individuals may purchase insurance to reduce their anxiety about experiencing such a ﬁnancial
loss. It is important to separate these two goals, ﬁnancial protection against the loss and reduction
of anxiety about the loss, because people vary in the degree to which each goal is important, and
situations vary in the degree to which they make ﬁnancial losses vivid and to which they provoke
or relieve anxiety, and the relative importance of these goals may change over time. One may also
anticipate anxiety, and take measures to avoid it (for example, some people claim that they do not
ﬂy in airplanes, not because they fear a crash, but because they fear being anxious about a crash).
However, if one fails to avoid anxiety about a loss, there may still be opportunities to reduce the
anxiety by taking protective measures, including insurance, where appropriate.
Regret is quite different from anxiety, in that it is primarily experienced after a loss occurs
rather than before. Consider the example of mailing a package worth $50. Insurance may be
readily available. If one does not purchase it, then if the package is lost or badly damaged, one is
quite likely to wish that one had purchased the insurance. Sometimes, the emotion of regret
accompanying  such  a  wish  is  quite  unpleasant. If,  at  the  time  of  mailing,  one  anticipates
unpleasant regret if an uninsured loss occurs, then one may decide to avoid the possibility of such
regret by purchasing the insurance.
Individuals may also purchase insurance as a form of consolation should they suffer a loss.
In particular, if one has special affection for an item, such as a piece of art, then the knowledge
that one can make a claim should the item by destroyed or stolen has special meaning to the
person.  Hsee  and  Kunreuther  (2000)  attribute  the  higher  premiums  for  the  same  amount  of
coverage that individuals are willing to pay for objects they love than for those where they don’t
have special feeling as due to the need for consolation.
Usually, a strong  positive  attachment  to  an  object  either  makes  no  difference  to  the
probability of damage, theft, etc., or perhaps actually reduces this probability, if extra care is
taken. Indeed, in a recent study of willingness to purchase warranties (Piao & Kunreuther, 2006),
"loving" an object made it seem less likely to subjects that the object would need repair. This was
true whether or not statistical information about repair frequencies was given. This same study
also showed that "love" did not, on average, produce a signiﬁcant change in the anticipated cost
of repair. If anything, anticipated cost decreases for a loved object. People should be less willing
to purchase them for loved objects but, in fact, are more willing to do so.
(4) Satisfying requirements
Insurance  coverage  is  often  mandatory  as  in  the  case  of  automobile  liability  insurance
required  by  states,  homeowners  insurance  required  by  mortgage  lenders,  ﬂood  insurance  in
special ﬂood hazard areas required as a condition for a federally insured mortgage, or malpractice
insurance for several different professions.
In these cases, purchase of insurance may be viewed as a subgoal for meeting endgoals
such as owning a car or a home or practicing one’s profession.  The same holds, to a large extent,
when insurance decisions are made in conformity to social norms, rather than strict requirements.Goals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 17
(5) Satisfying social and/or cognitive nor  ms
Many insurance decisions are based on what other people are doing, or on what respected
others  think  is  an  appropriate  action  to  take.  For  example,  a  new parent  may  purchase  life
insurance mainly because his or her own parent, partner, or ﬁnancial advisor thinks that it is
important to provide protection for the spouse and child, and the amount purchased might follow
some standard guideline (e.g., three times annual income). Once again, multiple goals may be in
play: the new parent may be trying to achieve goal (1), protection of the family against a low-
probability high-impact event, but also may be trying to do what others expect or wish.
There is also empirical evidence that purchase of insurance, like adoption of new products,
is based on knowledge of what friends and neighbors have done (Kunreuther, et al., 1978). There
is a vast literature on social inﬂuence some of it especially relevant to protective decision making
(e.g.,  Riad,  Norris  &  Ruback,  1999).  For  present  purposes,  however,  we mainly  want  to
distinguish  between  "non-extraneous"  social  inﬂuence—those  actions  and  opinions  of  other
people that provide useful information to a decision maker about the probability of a catastrophic
ev  ent, about the likely consequences of such an event, or about the nature of insurance plans that
could be advantageous—versus social inﬂuence that seems extraneous, in the sense used here.
A clear-cut demonstration of extraneous social inﬂuence would show mediated changes to
select a particular plan involving insurance that was unaccompanied by changes in beliefs about
the probabilities or consequences of a loss event. An illustration of this behavior came from a
pretest interview of an earthquake questionnaire when a homeowner hearing that his neighbor had
purchased  earthquake insurance  indicated  that  he  would  want  to  buy  such  coverage  himself
without obtaining any additional data on the risk he was facing or the actual cost of coverage
(Kunreuther, 1978).
Numerous other examples can be cited. In our discussion of ﬂood insurance (Table 4), we
cited "feel justiﬁed" as a possibly important goal. Someone who purchases ﬂood insurance soon
after suffering damage from such a disaster may do so in part because it is easy to justify the
expenditure, by pointing to the ﬂood that just occurred. Cancellation of insurance coverage after
some  years  of  coverage  may  occur  by  using  the  social  norm  that  it  is  hard  to  justify  an
expenditure that has not paid off.
In  fact,  people  are  concerned  with  justifying  their  decisions  to  themselves  and  others
(Shaﬁr, Simonson & Tversky 1993).  In the process, people often use arguments that have little to
do with the tradeoffs between the cost of insurance and the expected loss that forms the bases of
economic analyses of insurance transactions (Hogarth & Kunreuther 1995).
4. Explaining insurance decisions and anomalies
We  discuss SEMAUT, prospect  theory, and  the  present  model  of  constructed  choice  as
potential explanations for insurance decisions and for what appear to be anomalies or suboptimal
decisions.  It will be obvious, from what has gone before, that one of our reasons for preferring
the present model to SEMAUT has to do with the context-sensitivity of insurance decisions. We
argue, however, that quite apart from this criticism, neither SEMAUT nor CPT comes close to
describing the realities of insurance.
The expected-utility account and its limitations
We  begin by considering the simple classical account of insurance decisions, based on a
concave utility function for total assets. Since insurance contracts mostly have neg  ative expected
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risk-averse (concave) utility function U(A), relating utility U to total assets A. Such a concave
function accords with the more qualitative concept of "catastrophic" loss. Compare a reduction in
assets by loss L or by loss ten time smaller, L/10. For a concave curve, the drop in utility for loss
L is more than 10 times larger than the drop for loss L/10. Thus, the decision maker prefers to
make a premium payment Q = L/10 rather than to accept a 10% chance of the loss L. More
generally, the decision maker prefers to pay premium Q rather than to accept a probability p of
loss L if and only if
(1) U(A   Q) > pU(A   L) + (1   p)U(A).
We  next giv  e a concrete example, both to illustrate the reasoning given above and as an
introduction to the limitations of this idea. Suppose that a decision maker has an exponential
utility function for total assets, speciﬁcally:
(2) U(A) = 1   e A/A0 .
This utility function approaches an asymptote of 1 for very large A; the parameter A0 gives the
asset level for which utility difference from zero asset level is about 63. 2 % of the difference
between zero assets and the saturated maximum utility level.
Note that 1/A0 is usually thought of as the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion,
i.e., it is curvature  U  /U  of the utility function. The exponential function is often used because
it has the simple property that absolute risk aversion is independent of asset level A. Here,
however, we ﬁnd it more useful to interpret A0 as a gauge of the magnitude of a loss L. To do
this, we view zero assets as a natural reference point. An increment or decrement in assets of A0,
which spans over 60% of the utility range between zero assets and the utility asymptote can safely
be classiﬁed as a large gain or loss. The usual (Arrow-Pratt) interpretation of A0 is local: its
inverse is the curvature of the utility function. By treating zero asset level as a natural reference
point, we are able to give it this more global interpretation.
An example; the "loading" factor of an insurance contract Consider a household with
total  assets  of  $300,000,  including  a  home  worth  $200,000,  and  suppose  and  that  for  this
household, A0 = $100, 000. Suppose that the probability of a severe ﬁre or natural disaster that
would  destroy their  home  is  about  1/400  per  year. By the  preceding  criterion,  the  loss  of
$200,000 would be viewed as certainly a large loss for this household. Its expected annual loss,
however, is $200000/400 = $500. The household might be able to purchase insurance that would
fully reimburse a $200000 loss for about $1000 annual premium: this would allow the insurer to
pay claims, cover administrative costs, and make a proﬁt.  Because of the sharp curvature of the
exponential utility curve, the household should be happy to pay $1000 annually for this coverage;
in fact, the maximum value of Q that satisﬁes Inequality (1) is about $1585.
This account of insurance seems plausible in the given example.  However, it does not fare
well when it comes to smaller losses. First, at the opposite extreme, it predicts unwillingness to
pay much more than an actuarially fair price to eliminate deductibles. Suppose that the household
under discussion has a 1/20 chance per year of ﬁre or damage producing a loss of $1000 or less.
Their utility is nearly linear with money over a range of $1000, and so the household should be
willing to pay only a few cents more than the expected loss to eliminate a $1000 deductible. In
fact, the premium increases substantially to eliminate a $1000 deductible, and many people are
willing to pay it.
Even if one is willing to treat behavior vis-a-vis deductibles as an anomaly that the theory
simply  does  not  address,  there  remains  the  problem  of  insuring  against  intermediate  losses.
Consider the household in the above example, with a home worth only $100,000. The expected
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of  3,  to  less  than  $430. If  they can  insure  a  $200,000  home  for  $1000,  the  premium  for  a
$100,000 home will be at least $500; and so the theory predicts that they would prefer to be self-
insure for $100,000!
This is not a minor anomaly. Many types of insurance contracts have loading factors of
2.0 or more: the insurer charges at least twice the expected loss, to cover claims with a safety
factor, to cover administrative costs and to make a proﬁt.  Homeowners insurance, even with a
large deductible, generally has a loading factor more than 2. (For example, Sydnor, 2006 reports
a loading factor of 2.6 in one western state for policies with $1000 deductible, and much larger
loading factors for decrements in the deductible.) The ﬁrst example shows that for a loss of
2 A0, with  probability  1/400,  the  maximum  acceptable  loading  factor  for  the  household  in
question  is  $1585/$500 = 3.17,  a  quite  reasonable  ﬁgure. But  if  the  loss  in  question  is  only
A0 = $100, 000, the maximum acceptable loading factor is $430/$250 = 1.72, a value that might
be difﬁcult or impossible to ﬁnd in the market for homeowner’s insurance.
Maximum acceptable loading factor for a discrete loss L One can solve Equations 1
and 2 for the maximum premium, Q, that a household is willing to pay, as a function of the loss L
and the probability p, and ask when the ratio Q/p L is at least 2. Figure 2 shows a contour plot
of the maximum acceptable loading factor, Q/p L. Here L, the horizontal axis, is scaled in units
of A0. In the above example, 1 unit is $100,000. The vertical axis is just probability, conﬁned to
the domain of reasonably low-probability events.  What the ﬁgure shows dramatically is that
acceptance of loading factors of 2 or more requires losses that are at least 1. 4 A0 (increasing to
1.6 for higher loss probabilities). All the maximum acceptable loading factors exceed 1; thus, as
we already knew, exponential utility leads everywhere to insurance seeking; but under this theory,
realistic prices will be paid only for insuring losses that are large, on the scale of the 63.2%
saturation constant. Since even wealthy people routinely insure possessions worth a few tens of
thousands of dollars, accepting loading factors of 2 or more, the theory is contradicted widely by
actual insurance behavior.
INSERT FIGURE 2
Similar  calculations  could  be  done  for  more  realistic  scenarios,  in  which  there  is  a
continuous probability distribution of losses rather than a discrete probability for a single known
loss,  and  with  alternative  concave  utility  functions. Calculations  with  hyperbolic  and  power
utility functions (for which the zero asset level is a very clear reference point) lead us to suspect
that results similar to those in Figure 2 are fairly general.
Note that Figure 2 makes it easy to see why the exponential utility fails to account for
decisions to have low or zero deductibles. In the extreme case, for a loading factor of 2 to be
acceptable for eliminating a $100 deductible, one must satisfy the equation $100   1. 4 A0, thus,
A0   $70. This means that the decision maker in question would prefer a sure $70 over a 60%
chance to win one billion dollars3.
In light of the fact that people do insure against small and intermediate losses, and in light
of the discussion of insurance-related goals in Section 3 above, one may wish to modify the
preceding simple theory by using the full strength of SEMAUT to incorporate multiple goals for
insurance decisions, while retaining the core idea of a concave utility function for total assets. In
Section 2, we suggested one reason why this might be difﬁcult, or might lead to an unsatisfactory
theory. Permanent goals with stable tradeoffs might indeed lend themselves to such a theory.
Goals  that  depend  strongly  on  what  appears  salient  or  goals  that  are  suggested  by  the  very
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alternative plans among which the decision maker must choose could not be so incorporated.
In addition to the above argument based on context-dependence, there is another, based on
reference-dependence,  which  provides  a  segue  to  discussing  prospect  theory. Many ﬁnancial
goals are perceived as deviations from the status quo, rather than as changes in total assets. The
exponential  utility  function  partially  deals with  this  perception,  since  its  prescribed  choices
among lotteries are invariant under translation (adding or subtracting a ﬁxed constant C to every
asset level A in the lottery). It can thus be interpreted in terms of increments and decrements
from current asset level.  However, even with an exponential utility curve, classical utility theory
does  not  account  for  the  difference  between  loss  framing  and  gain  framing  for  the  same
increments and decrements. For example, many owners of relatively new automobiles are happy
to pay $40 additional premium per year to have a small deductible, say $100, on their collision
insurance, rather than a $500 deductible on an otherwise identical insurance contract. Yet the
same owners would balk at paying $40 for a lottery ticket that wins $400 just in case their
automobile happens to suffer appreciable collision damage during the coming 12 months. One
would view such a lottery ticket as unlikely to win; moreover, the prize is not very large, even if
one  does  win.  So  $40  seems  much  too  high  a  price.  From  the  standpoint  of  utility  theory,
however, the lottery ticket is at least as valuable as the lower deductible on the insurance contract.
The lottery ticket nets $400 if there is appreciable collision damage. The insurance contract nets
the full $400 only if the damage exceeds $500.
Prospect theory and its limitations
Character  istic features of prospect theory Prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman,
1979) was developed as a descriptive acount of risky choice.  One important type of context
effect—the effect of reference point—is accepted as an empirical fact and used as a starting point
for the theory. Current assets serve as a reference point, relative to which losses are differentiated
sharply from gains, and are valued quite differently. The theory replaces the concave  utility
function for total assets with a value function that has one branch for changes perceived as gains,
another for perceived losses.  Investigations of lotteries with known probabilities and gains or
losses as outcomes led to a tentative speciﬁcation of the general form of the value function—
concave for gains, but convex for losses—and to a general form for decision weights as a function
of speciﬁed probability. Decision weights are applied as multipliers to the values that arise from
gains and losses. For present purposes, the most important feature of the decision weight is that
small probabilities, the ones most relevant for insurance contexts, are overweighted.
Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) was developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) for
multi-outcome  lotteries. It  deals  with  the  phenomenon  of  rank-dependence  of  the  decision
weights that are applied to particular gains or losses. This has become the standard form for the
theory. For our simpliﬁed examples, where the insurance decision compares a sure loss of Q, the
premium paid, with a chance p to lose L (otherwise nothing), the distinction is unimportant, but
we continue to use the acronym CPT.
As a sidelight on CPT, one interpretation of rank dependence might be that multiple gains
or losses are construed by the decision maker as deﬁning a set of goals. For example, consider a
lottery in which one wins $1000 with probability 1%, $50 with probability 9%, and otherwise
(90%) nothing is won or lost. The CPT value for this lottery can be written in the following form,
where V(x) is the value for gain x and W(p) is the decision-weight for probability p.
(3) V = [V(50)   V(0)]W(. 10) + [V(1000)   V(50)]W(. 01) .
One can interpret this in terms of two goals: getting at least $50, and getting $1000 rather
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weight based on the cumulative probability (9% + 1%) of achieving it, the second term similarly
multiplies the incremental value of the second goal (given that the ﬁrst has been achieved) by the
decision weight for 1%. This makes sense when goals are ordered, as they often are (e.g., getting
at least a cost-of-living salary increase, then perhaps getting a large increase; at least not losing a
chess game, then perhaps winning the game).  It is this form of the equation that suggested the
general sum-of-products decision rule for combining goal values with decision weights in Table
4, i.e.,  v j wij, and thus led to the more general discussion of possible decision rules in a
plan/goal framework.
CPT and  insurance Explanations  of  insurance  decisions  based  on CPT differ  in  a
fundamental way from ones based on expected utility. The CPT value function is convex, not
concave, in the loss domain—the opposite of what might be thought appropriate for explanation
of insurance purchases with negative expected value for the purchaser. This shape is strongly
supported by robust and oft-replicated laboratory ﬁndings that decision makers are risk-seeking,
not risk-averse, in the domain of losses. The question arises as to how to reconcile two basic
facts: people are risk-seeking with respect to losses, yet willing to insure against losses.
The usual CPT explanation of insurance purchase is based entirely on decision weights,
rather than gains and losses: people manifest high decision weights to low-probability events.
This means that they are willing to pay more than the expected loss for insurance.
This explanation has some intuitive psychological plausibility: people worry (sometimes
excessively, sometimes not) about low-probability high-negative-impact events, and give them
high  weights  in  decision  making. Within  the  standard  parameterization  of CPT (Tversky &
Kahneman,  1992)  however,  this  explanation  is  not  viable  quantitatively. Corresponding  to
Inequality 1, the CPT condition for paying premium Q to insure against loss L with probability p
is simply this:
(4) V( Q) > W(p)V( L).
Deﬁne  the  maximum  acceptable  loading  factor  as   = Q/p L, where Q is  the  maximum
willingness  to  pay  for  the  insurance. Substituting  this  into  Equation  4  gives
V(   p L) = W(p)V( L). In the standard parameterization of CPT, howev  er, V is a power
function (of its absolute value, with sign restored), with exponent  . This means that the factor
L
  drops out of both sides of the above equation, giving a simple formula for   as a function of
p:





Therefore  the  maximum  acceptable  loading  factor  is  a  function  of  loss  probability  only,
independent of L. Whereas in Figure 2, for exponential utility, loading-factor contours are fairly
vertical, i.e., they depend mostly on L and only weakly on p, especially for low or intermediate
losses  relative  to the  saturation  asset  level,  and  for p > 1/100. By contrast,  in CPT the
corresponding contours would be perfectly horizontal, depending only on p and not at all on L.
Consequently, rather than plotting loading-factor contours in L , p coordinates, we simply plot
loading factor as a function of p.
INSERT FIGURE 3
The solid (lower) curve in Figure 3 shows the plot of Equation 5, using the standard CPT
parameterization of W(p) for losses. The maximum acceptable loading factor is already below 2











































Figure 3:  loading factors in cumulative prospect theory
(standard parameterization)
NLIB interpretation
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will not purchase insurance even when the transaction has a positive expected value.
The loading factors below 1 are perhaps not fatal for CPT: neg  ative events with probability
over 25% are unlikely to have high impact (or we would all be in sorry shape), and it may be both
difﬁcult and undesirable to insure against them. However, loss probabilities in the range between
3% and 10% are staples of insurance sales, mostly at loading factors above 2. Thus, CPT, in its
usual form, simply cannot account for the market for insurance.
Figure 3 carries the calculation of loading factor down to a loss probability of 1/100; but in
fact, another problem for CPT is that the probability weighting function derived from laboratory
experiments cannot be extrapolated to very low probabilities, because at some point many people
in effect round a low probability down to 0, saying "this means it won’t happen to me." Thus,
CPT does not really deal with insurance against events with very low probability but very high
negative impact.
An alternative inter  pretation Sydnor (2006) examined loading factors for deductibles in
homeowner’s insurance.  He reached  a  similar  conclusion:  neither  expected  utility  (where  he
focuses chieﬂy on the power, rather than the exponential form for the function U) nor CPT in its
standard form can account for people’s purchase of low deductibles.  However, Sydnor suggested
an  important  variant  of CPT, according  to  which  payments  made  for purchase  (including
premiums  for  purchase of insurance) are treated as negative gains, rather than as losses. This is
the "NLIB" (no loss in buying) interpretation (Novemsky & Kahneman, 2005). This assumption
changes Equation (4): V( Q) is replaced by  V(Q), i.e., losing Q is replaced by losing the value
that corresponds to a gain of Q. The equation becomes:
(4 )  V(Q) > W(p)V( L).
In the standard parameterization of CPT, the ratio  V(Q)/V( Q) is 1/2.25, the inverse of the
loss-aversion coefﬁcient.  The NLIB assumption therefore leads to the loading-factor equation





This is shown as the dashed curve in Figure 3. Since   = 0. 88 in the standard parameterization,
the dashed curve is about 2.5 times higher than the solid curve.  The loading factors given by this
curve do not reject prospect theory out of hand as an account of insurance purchase. This is
consistent with Sydnor’s conclusion for deductibles on homeowner’s insurance policies.
In short, Sydnor interprets willingness to purchase insurance as principally an effect of
framing: though people are risk-seeking in the domain of losses, reframing a sure loss as payment
of  an  insurance  premium  eliminates  the  loss-aversion  factor  for the  premium,  and  then  the
remaining loss aversion (for potential losses covered by the policy) makes the insurance policy
attractive. As Figure  3  shows,  Sydnor’s theory  makes  strong  quantitative  predictions  about
willingness to pay for insurance: the maximum loading factor should be independent of loss
magnitude, and people should purchase insurance at loading factors of around 2.0 even for loss
probabilities between ½ and 1. These predictions, which seem unlikely to be conﬁrmed, could be
tested more extensively in laboratory and ﬁeld studies of acceptable insurance contracts.
Overweighting,  underweighting  and  neglecting  probabilities There  is  a  more
fundamental difﬁculty with the CPT account of insurance purchase. People considering insurance
contracts rarely, if ever, hav  e available explicit loss probabilities. Often, loss probability does not
seem to play a role in their decisions (Camerer & Kunreuther, 1989; Hogarth & Kunreuther,
1995; Huber, Wider & Huber, 1997).  When loss probability is in fact considered, it is derived
from experience, not from actuarial tables. However,  Hertwig, Barron, Weber & Erev (2004)
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people underweight low probabilities in making risky decisions except when there has been a
very recent occurrence of the event class in question. Such underweighting could, of course, be
one important factor in phenomena such as the cancellation of ﬂood insurance policies that was
noted above; it may not be easy to separate underweighting of the probability from difﬁculty in
justifying  the  decision  to  continue  the  insurance  and  from  fading  anxiety. In any  case,  the
overweighting postulated in CPT may not be relevant to most insurance decisions.
It  seems  implausible  that  people’s willingness  to  pay  for  insurance  is  linked  tightly  to
probability of loss and not at all to magnitude of loss. On the one hand, people often neglect
probability in their thinking about insurance; on the other hand, people undoubtedly pay some
attention  to  the  affordability  of  losses. Insurance  protection  against  very  small  losses,  e.g.,
breakage  of  glassware  in  one’s kitchen,  would  be  viewed  as  absurd. The  power-function
formulation of the CPT value function leads to willingness to pay that is scale free, as shown in
Equations 5 and 5  above. This is one of the great conveniences in applying CPT—it does not
matter whether the monetary amounts are dollars, Euros, or yen. But from the standpoint of
insurance, it is a weakness. Losing 100 yen is much less serious than losing 100 dollars, and it is
implausible that the loading factor for insurance will be exactly the same. In the domain of
insurance, utility theory makes more sense psychologically, since it postulates that magnitude of
loss does matter considerably. It would, of course, be possible to replace the CPT value function
by a family of functions that do reﬂect the underlying scale of gains and losses. The family of
functions could be constructed to be linear over some range of sufﬁciently small losses and gains,
to be concave for gains and convex for intermediate losses, and ﬁnally, to hav  e another concave
region corresponding to catastrophic losses. for a given decision maker. Even such a function,
however, would fail to account for insurance decisions that are based on multiple goals. In our
view, a satisfactory understanding of insurance behavior needs to take into account the behavioral
evidence that a number of different goals are sometimes considered in connection with insurance
and other protective decisions.  It is to this multiple-goal perspective that we now turn.
Explanations based on constructed choice
In the introduction we noted three classes of anomaly: (1) insuring against non-catastrophic
losses,  (2)  underinsuring  against  truly  catastrophic  losses,  and  (3)  exhibiting  sensitivity  to
"extraneous" factors.  In exemplifying these anomalies, we have already indicated several ways in
which the theory partially explains behavior
Our  classiﬁcation  of  anomalies  assumes  that  the  main  goal  for  insurance  purchase  is
protection  against  catastrophic  ﬁnancial  loss. Failure  to  pursue  this  goal,  when  it  is  readily
attainable, and pursuit of other goals are viewed as anomalous. It is natural to explain these
anomalies in terms of the alternative goals that people do in fact pursue, such as avoiding regret,
reducing anxiety, getting a return on investment, or satisfying social norms, as suggested in our
taxonomy in Section 3.
According to the plan/goal account, choices depend not only on goals, but on the decision
rules used in plan selection. For example, the discussion of possible intransitivity with multiple
goals (Figure 1) indicated how particular decision rules might increase the tendency to choose a
low deductible and/or decrease the tendency to insure fully against a catastrophic loss.
A process-or  iented schema for constructed choice
In the remainder of this section, we focus on some of the main cognitive processes involved
in  choice  according  to  the  plan/goal  theory. To this  end,  Figure  4  offers  a  process-oriented
schema for context-dependent constructed choice. The four dark arrows indicate some of the
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arrows indicate mechanisms of human perception or memory through which context inﬂuences
plans, goals, resources and decision rules.
Central to the schema are goals and plans. The heavy downward arrow from goals to
plans  indicates  the  main  way  in  which  goals  bear  on  plans:  via  decision  weights wij.
Psychologically, this arrow corresponds to the decision maker’s beliefs about the likelihood of
attaining goal j, or the degree of approximation to goal j, if plan i is selected.
There  is  also  an  upward,  dashed  arrow from  plans  back  to  goals. This  represents  a
feedback  process,  whereby  a  plan  that  is  considered  suggests  additional  goals  that  could  be
achieved through that plan, or, more generally, alters the importance values v j for the various
goals.  This feature was discussed at length following Table 4. As examples in which a goal is
suggested or emphasized by a plan, we mentioned installing a protective device which one sees
offered for sale in a catalog, or opting for an innovative provision available as an option in an
insurance contract. We  emphasize that this is not merely a question of a plan being attractive
because it gives a high decision weight w to an existing important goal. Rather, it is the value v
of the goal that is changed when it is made salient by the plan. In the extreme, the goal may have
been unknown, in effect, v = 0, prior to the decision maker’s considering a particular plan.
The upward feedback arrow is one of ﬁve dashed arrows, each suggesting a different route
by which context can affect constructed choice. We  reg  ard this feedback as a context effect
because the plans initially presented constitute an important part of the choice context.  In a ﬂuid
situation, where novel plans can be sought and constructed, the two arrows reciprocally linking
goals and plans could be activated repeatedly.
The dashed arrow directly from context to goals represents another type of contextual
inﬂuence.  This arrow is labelled memor  y activation (Cantor  &  Engle,  1993),  because  the
context serves as a memory cue to activate concepts and thoughts related to particular goals. For
example, if one recently regretted one’s failure to purchase insurance, then thoughts about the
possibility of a similar loss will remind one of that recent regret, and might thus strongly activate
the goal of avoiding regret.  Similarly, if one experienced anxiety because of lack of insurance, a
contextual reminder of that anxiety might strongly activate the goal of avoiding future anxiety.
More generally, most effects of context on emotion-related goals are tied to this arrow.
INSERT FIGURE 4
Context can also affect what plans are available and what decision rule is used to select a plan.
These  two dashed  arrows  in  Figure  4  are  labelled  with  another  process  in  human  memory,
matching (Seifert, et al., 2002). Generally speaking, matching is linked to recognition: a present
stimulus  matches  something  stored  in  memory. Here,  the  matching  process  establishes  a
correspondence,  or  partial  analogy, between  the  current  choice  context  and  some  familiar
situation.  Finding such an analogy often leads the decision maker to recall the plan selected
previously, and to select a partially analogous plan. Context thus adds to the set of plans under
consideration.  For example, if one has decided in one situation to self-insure (or not) against
small losses, one may in a different but partly analogous situation seek an insurance plan with a
high (or a low) deductible.
Alternatively or additionally, if there is severe conﬂict concerning the available plans, the
decision maker may recall the method used previously to resolve the analogous conﬂict. Thus,
context can make an additional decision rule available.  This is most obvious in cases where
analogy is used to support a complex decision rule, such as estimation and maximization of
subjective expected utility, but context can also suggest simpler decision heuristics. For example,


































Figure 4.  A schema for constructed choice
dashed arrows show context effectsGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 25
(e.g., by setting a threshold decision weight for an important goal), one may be led to attempt a
similar simpliﬁcation in the current choice situation.
The ﬁnal dashed arrow in Figure 4 goes from context to resources. We label this by the
psychological  process mental  accounting (Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1984;  Thaler, 1999).
Changing  the  arrangement  of  mental  accounts  may  either  increase  or  decrease  the  resources
available to solve a decision problem, and may thus suggest new plans or eliminate plans that
draw on forbidden resources. Here is an illustrative anecdote.  A couple planning a temporary
partial move to a not-too-distant city was considering how to manage their two owned vehicles
through the duration of this move. Each plan considered had severe disadvantages.  In the context
of a recent car rental, however, it occurred to them that in addition to their existing vehicles,
money could be used as a resource to solve transportation problems. They could simply lease an
additional vehicle in the new city. Although this solution involved additional expense, it seemed
superior  to  previously  considered  plans. As  long  as  their  mental  accounting  only  concerned
management  of  existing  vehicles,  the  better  solution  was  unavailable;  their  insight  was  that
money could be added to the resources called upon in planning.
Insurance decisions are often inﬂuenced by considerations related to resources. A person
might choose not to pay a $150 annual premium for general accident insurance (paying $500,000
for loss of life in any accident involving a common carrier), but might pay $25 for $500,000
insurance on a single ﬂight. The $150 annual premium could be reframed temporally (less than
$3/week), or it could be framed as an expenditure within an insurance budget (ﬁnd the needed
$150 by increasing the deductible on homeowners and/or automobile collision insurance), or yet
alternatively, it could  be framed as an expenditure within a general household budget (save $150
by bring lunch from home every day for two months).  Context (including advertising) determines
how such an expenditure is framed.
Without  going  into  great  detail,  we  remark  that  under  the  plan/goal  theory, mental
accounting  is  not  always  "irrational." A decision  rule  that  treats  each  of  several  goals  as
extremely important might well lead to selection of a plan that sets aside or otherwise designates
resources devoted to each goal. Group decisions (by governments and other organizations) use
explicit budgets as a resolution of goal conﬂict; individual decisions, with intra-individual goal
conﬂict,  may  likewise  be  simpliﬁed  greatly  by  such  accounting,  whether  done  mentally  or
through written budgets, dedicated savings, etc. Yet context can lead to redrawing the boundaries
of such accounts.
Figure 4 provides a rich set of possible mechanisms that should be considered in a general
theory of decision making and in particular are related to insurance anomalies. The ﬁrst two
classes  of  anomaly, insuring  against  non-catastrophic  losses  and  underinsuring  against  truly
catastrophic losses, relate directly to the multiple goals involved in selecting an insurance plan.
Since goals can be made salient by plans, and salient goals may dominate the decision rule that is
used to choose a plan, it is easy to see how marketing of insurance plans affects choices, and how
the default settings for parameters within insurance plans also affect choices. Flight insurance is
sold at airports, package insurance at post ofﬁces, credit-balance life and disability insurance is
offered to credit-card applicants and bill-payers, dormitory theft insurance is offered to parents of
college students, etc. In all these cases, the available insurance plans make salient one or more
goals that might get little or no weight in a different context.  Insurance plans also deﬁne temporal
frames for planning (e.g., month, year, or lifetime), and thereby affect mental accounting and
alter the perceived resources available.
The mechanisms shown in Figure 4 also help explicate some of the effects of "extraneous"
factors on insurance decisions. Positive or neg  ative affect attached to an object or event activates
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avoiding regret, and insurance may be perceived as reducing regret, even though the ﬁnancial
beneﬁt of the insurance is no greater than in the case of an unloved (but needed) object. We hav  e
already discussed how recent experience of events such as ﬂooding can also activate emotion-
related goals.
What friends and relatives advise or themselves decide to do is often extraneous, i.e., it
does not change the set of plans available or expectations about probability or magnitude of loss.
Adherence to quasi-legal or leg  al norms and to social norms. is itself an important goal, however,
and may strongly inﬂuence the selection of a plan. Sometimes the decision rule itself may be no
more complicated than adherence to a clear norm. One may purchase insurance (or not) simply
because that is the expectation of one’s boss or one’s spouse.  There are also important cases of
formally  mandated  protection:  examples  include  homeowners  insurance,  automobile  liability
insurance, and professional malpractice insurance, as well as ﬁre-safety inspections, required ﬁre
drills, and seatbelt requirements. Large employers in the United States provide group health and
life insurance. We also note the important role of defaults (which in many cases can be viewed as
social norms) in affecting the details of chosen insurance plans. Being able to justify decisions is
itself an important social norm; protective actions that other people select themselves deﬁne a
norm, and in addition, doing the same is unlikely to be challenged or will be easy to justify.
Novel prescr  iptive questions in constructed choice
This  approach  to  decision  making  raises  a  host  of  novel prescriptive  questions.  In
SEMAUT, tastes are not challenged. If one wants an extraordinary wine, one can pay $500 per
bottle.  Similarly, to promote peace of mind, one can pay $80, reducing a deductible from $500 to
$250 even though over a 10 year period, one will spend $800, while the probability of collecting
the extra $250 at least once within 10 years is only about 35%. In the original loss/gain framing
demonstration of Tversky and Kahneman (1979), the intent was purely descriptive: gain framing
produces risk aversion, while loss framing, for logically equivalent outcomes, leads to selection of
the risky plan.  There is no guidance about which frame, if either, should be used. Advice about
the  right  choice  would  presumably  be  given on an entirely  different  basis,  maximization  of
expected utility. In the constructed choice framework, however, the "true" preferences that lead to
maximization  are  mythical:  all  choices  are  context-dependent.  In the  absence  of  other
prescriptive guidance, one is forced to consider whether a given problem should be framed in
terms of loss or gain.
In  what  follows,  we  discuss  in  greater  detail  the  two features  of  our  theory  that  are
especially important for understanding insurance anomalies. The fact that plans available in the
decision context can suggest new goals leads to insights about insuring against non-catastrophic
losses and about sensitivity to extraneous factors.  We mention several additional examples.  The
idea of decision mechanisms involving decision-weight thresholds for important goals helps us to
understand failures to insure against truly catastrophic losses.
Goals suggested by plans
The very idea of risk sharing through insurance was once a novel family of plans. Prior to
its invention, some severe ﬁnancial risks (especially in trading over long distances) would have
seemed unavoidable.  The advent of insurance plans would have led many to adopt the goal of
reducing ﬁnancial risk, just as the availability of seat belts, and later of air bags led many to install
them.  The availability of these innovations led to people’s adopting the goal of reducing their risk
of death from automobile accidents. At a later time, both became mandatory. Indeed, the fact
that people adopt new goals in response to novel plans is probably one of the principal forces
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In the realm of health insurance deductibles, a rather important goal comes into play: one
might wish to avoid being placed in a future position where one can reduce out-of-pocket costs by
accepting increased health risks for oneself or one’s family, e.g., by declining preventive care or
other advisable but optional treatment. Av oiding such difﬁcult tradeoffs is made salient by the
availability of health-insurance plans that pay for routine and preventive care.  If the available
health  plans  included  only  hospitalization  and  major  medical  expenses,  then  people  would
continually make health-care/money tradeoffs.  They might very well wish they didn’t hav  e to do
so; but if people were accustomed to making these tradeoffs, many would be reluctant to pay
large up-front premiums to gain coverage for routine and preventive care.  This also illustrates
how plans affect temporal framing: full-coverage plans place health-care decisions in a fairly
long-term frame, envisaging repeated use of the health-care system, and thus make more salient
the goal of avoiding repeated difﬁcult tradeoffs.
Though one can give many additional positive examples of important goals that are adopted
in response to novel plans, it is also clear that marketers can take advantage of human goal
malleability to generate plans that are deceptively attractive to consumers and highly proﬁtable
for the marketers.  One broad area where this can occur is in setting default values for plans.
A dramatic example of the effect of defaults was uncovered with the introduction of no-
fault automobile insurance in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  Both states introduced the option of
a reduced right to sue accompanied by lower insurance rates. In New Jersey individuals had to
acquire the right to sue and in Pennsylvania the default was the full right to sue. When offered the
choice, only about 20 percent of New Jersey drivers chose to acquire the full right to sue while
approximately 75% of Pennsylvania drivers retained this right. In other words residents in both
states maintained the default option. This ﬁnding was conﬁrmed in a laboratory experiment where
subjects (Johnson, et al. 1993) were given a similar choice, but were randomly assigned to one of
three groups: current automobile insurance with full right to sue, with limited right to sue, or with
no information about current right to sue.
The  overacceptance  of  default  values  has  become  a  well-known  and  much  studied
phenomenon, and probably is caused by several different underlying mechanisms. Among these,
we believe, is the inﬂuence of the default on people’s actual goals. Many more New Jersey than
Pennsylvania motorists may have thought that they would actually like to sue, since that option
was endorsed as a norm by the default plan they encountered.  More generally, defaults may be
viewed by consumers as goal-setting norms, when in fact, they are often the most proﬁtable
option for a vendor and thus possibly the least favorable for the consumer.
Insurance plans that bring in high proﬁts to insurers, in part by suggesting goals that might
otherwise  not  be  adopted,  include  low deductibles,  so-called  disappearing  deductibles,  rebate
plans, credit-card insurance, ﬂight insurance, and insurance on packages sent through the mail.
Low deductibles were discussed above. Disappearing deductibles are plans for which the
deductible applies in the case of small and moderate losses, but not for large losses. This may
suggest the goal of avoiding an out-of-pocket payout in a situation where one is already dealing
with the hassles of a major loss. This sounds attractive; but, in fact, loading factors are high: the
probability of major loss is low, the additional amount reimbursed by the insurer with a major loss
is not very high (only the deductible), and so the average return to the insurance purchasers is
much less than the additional premium paid.
Rebate plans return a portion of the insurance premium, provided that no claim has been
made in a speciﬁed period of time. These plans may lead consumers to adopt the goal of getting
an  "investment  return"  on  their  insurance  premiums. A number  of  years  ago,  an  insurance
company introduced a disability insurance plan for which policyholders received at age 65 a full
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promised an attractive return, but it created an economic incentive for those approaching the age
of 65 to avoid making a claim, if they had never made on up to that point. People who were
likely  to  need  disability  payments  found  themselves  not  wanting  to  use  their  policies. This
"reverse moral hazard" led regulators to request that the company withdraw this plan from the
market, since it undermined the main goal of insurance: those who suffer an insured loss should
be able to collect the amounts for which they are covered.
Credit-card insurance and ﬂight insurance are egregious examples of plans that suggests
goals in a particular context and exhibit very high loading factors.  In each case, the suggested
goals can be achieved much less expensively. Flight insurance was discussed in our introduction.
The cost of this insurance is 4 to 8 times higher than for the same level of coverage with general
accident insurance, and the latter covers many additional risks for a much longer period of time.
Credit-card insurance is essentially life-and-disability insurance, covering only the amount of
one’s credit card debt. Its selling point is that the current credit-card balance would be paid off in
case of death or disability. For people whose credit-card balances are burdensome, this would
have been an attractive goal.  Unlike the usual life and disability policies, the premiums for such
insurance plans do not take age into account. For a person not at high risk, or who is already
adequately protected by life insurance and disability insurance, adopting the goal of paying off a
credit-card balance in this way seems unwise: the risk is not catastrophic, and with premiums in
the neighborhood of $2 per $100 insured, the loading factor is high. We  do not know who
actually does purchase this insurance. If it is mostly purchased by people at high risk, then the
av  erage loading factor may be reasonable.
As a ﬁnal example, consider insurance on packages sent through the mail. Within the U.S.,
current rates are slightly over $1 per $100 of insured value (more for insured value less than $200,
and up to a maximum of only $500). While we don’t know the probability of loss or damage,
experience suggests that it is far less than 1%. The loading factor is high, and the losses involved
are seldom catastrophic. However,  people generally do what they can to protect objects sent
through the mail; for example, they may take care in preparing the package. An insurance plan
may be viewed as offering an additional opportunity to take care.
Thresholds for decision weights
Above, we discussed  plan  selection  mechanisms  involving  thresholds  for  the  decision
weights pertaining to a set of important goals. We suspect that this is one of the most frequently
used mechanisms. It is observable when group decisions are made in public: several goals are
discussed, and the plan ﬁnally adopted is one that offers a good chance to achieve each of them.
A plan for a new bridge is selected because the decision makers believe that the construction cost
will be within the budget limit, that the bridge will handle the expected volume of trafﬁc, that it
will be safe, and that it will have a long lifetime with acceptable maintenance costs. Other goals
(e.g., aesthetic quality) may also be considered and traded off against additional costs, but the
four goals just listed are essential, and the likelihood of achieving each must be high. One may
ask, how high?  Certainty is not achievable for any of the goals. Most likely the threshold for
acceptance will be set very high for safety and less high for the other goals.
When it comes to protective decisions, low probabilities of negative events may fall within
acceptance thresholds. Table 3 provides a simple example.  Someone may regard the avoidance
of catastrophic loss as an essential goal, yet the probability of 0.98 of achieving that goal may be
high enough to satisfy this person’s acceptance threshold—in which case plan 2, no insurance,
may be selected.
In fact, failures to purchase ﬂood or earthquake insurance are very common. Individuals
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be viewed as underweighting low probabilities, consistent with Hertwig, et al. (2004); we take the
slightly different theoretical view that the mechanism is one of acceptance thresholds for plan
selection.  Theories that postulate over- or underweighting of low probabilities have to commit to
one or the other, for any giv  en probability level and a given type of evidence bearing on the
probability. Our threshold theory, by contrast, suggests that the threshold level in a decision rule
depends on the importance of the particular goal, on the importance of other competing goals, and
quite possibly on other factors, especially on social norms concerning acceptable levels of risk.
Thus, a given risk of failure to achieve the goal may appear to be underestimated (as in the
example above, where a 2/100 chance of severe ﬂood is neglected) or the same probability may
appear to be overestimated (e.g., where a social norm demands near certainty for a particular
goal).
In the case of ﬂoods and earthquakes, these acceptance thresholds may well be too low: the
ev  ents can be catastrophic for uninsured victims. These cases are complex, however, because of
private insurers are reluctant to enter the market (regionally correlated losses lead to high levels of
risk to the insurer), premiums are high, and people count on government intervention as a form of
insurance.  What is  clearly  needed  in  these  cases  is  a  norm  that  leads  people  to  purchase
insurance.  This could take the form of a social norm within a group or the form of a legal
requirement to insure. Legal mandates, other ofﬁcial norms, and social norms all play a role in
getting people to protect themselves adequately, as noted above.
5. Prescriptive implications
In standard economic analysis, consumer tastes go unchallenged. It is not irrational to pay
$500 for an extraordinary bottle of wine that cannot be purchased for less. Paying $80 for a
feeling of "peace of mind" likewise should go unchallenged. In a constructed choice framework,
however, these are not literal tastes, comparable to liking raspberries or disliking prunes, they are
constructed choices; it is the construction process that can be examined critically.
Suppose,  for  example,  that  "peace  of  mind"  is  obtained  by  paying  $80  to  reduce  the
deductible on homeowner’s insurance from $500 to $250, and that the purchaser also believes
(rather accurately) that she, and others in comparable situations average only about 1 claim every
25 years that exceeds $250. If she thinks about a commitment to 10 years of insurance-with-
peace-of-mind, this will cost $800 extra over that period of time. The chance that she will collect
the extra $250 at least 3 times in the 10 years (thus breaking about even) is about 1 in 100,000.
Alternatively, she can think about the commitment in terms of cost per week: less than $2 for
peace of mind. Her choice may very well change, depending on whether she thinks about the
cost for peace of mind in a weekly, annual, or ten-year frame. In the weekly frame, $2 seems
trivial and $250 looms large (despite its low probability).  In the ten-year frame, $800 looms large
and the prospect of a $250 loss does not have so much effect on peace of mind.
The constructed-choice framework in fact leads to a host of difﬁcult prescriptive questions.
We provide a sampler of questions (but note that most of the answers are beyond the scope of this
paper and should be addressed by future research). What is the right temporal framing? What
about framing as gains versus losses? What is the best way to keep mental accounts, i.e., what
resources  should  be  committed  to  important  goals  and  what  should  remain  fungible? What
decision-weight thresholds should be set on various goals? Are there intrinsically maladaptive
conﬁgurations of goals? When should one use social norms as a guide? When should one pursue
emotion-related goals, versus attempting to manipulate and control one’s emotions?
Rather  than  tackling  these  questions,  we  limit  our  prescriptive  remarks  to  three  short
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emotion-related goals, and the third sketches a program of consumer education. Our rationale for
these choices will be embedded in the respective subsections.
Financial benchmarks
Financial  benchmarks  are  useful  as  starting  points  for  critical  analysis  of  constructed
choices.  For example, the preceding example, in which someone pays $80 per year extra to
decrease a homeowner’s deductible from $500 to $250 would raise a warning ﬂag, because we
think that in the world of insurance contracts, higher deductibles are almost always better deals.
More generally, any violation of one of the benchmarks we will propose here deserves careful
analysis.
The three simple benchmarks we suggest all run counter to popular choice. The reason is
simple:  since popular  choices  are  popular, insurers  can  collect  higher  premiums  for  them.
Unpopular choices can offer excellent protection from ﬁnancial risk at reasonable cost.
1. Consider the maximum loss and its probability What is the maximum loss one
could suffer from a particular type of negative event, how likely is such a loss, and how much
would it cost to insure fully against it? A person earning $60,000 per year probably does not
need $1 million life insurance, but $300,000 would give that person’s beneﬁciaries ﬁve years to
adjust to the loss of income. The probability of death in the next year, from all causes, is never
negligible,  so  that  much  insurance  should  be  purchased,  if  one  can  ﬁnd  the  money for  the
premium.  Similarly, homeowner’s insurance should, if at all possible, cover the full replacement
value of one’s house at least in case of ﬁre, since the probability of total destruction by ﬁre is not
negligible.
2. Look for the highest deductible To opt for a high deductible means that one is self-
insuring against losses smaller than that amount. One is thereby saving money on insurance.  Of
course, the deductible must be set low enough so that one can handle the loss if it occurs. Again,
a person earning $60,000 per year may not be able to accept a $10,000 deductible, but a $2000
loss, although very painful, might be manageable. Av oiding the possibility of any pain can be
expensive when converted to the extra annual premiums one must pay to achieve this goal.
To  illustrate  the  operation  of  these  two benchmarks,  consider  the  following  three
homeowner’s insurance policies:
annual premium deductible  coverage limit
policy A   $600  $1000 $100,000
policy B   $750  $500 $100,000
policy C   $750  $1000 $150,000
Assuming that the individual can manage a loss of $1000, policy A is superior to B: the reduction
from $1000 to $500 deductible is not worth $150. Assuming that the home would cost $150,000
to replace, policy C achieves much more important goals than B. Someone who purchased B and
whose home was destroyed by ﬁre would be $50,000 short of the funds needed to rebuild.  The
comparison of A with C is a bit less clear. If the loading factor for the extra coverage is about 2.0,
then the extra $150 premium implies a probability of $75/$50000 = .0015 per year for a total loss
by ﬁre. If more than 1 in 1000 homes of this type, in this region, are lost to ﬁre each year, then
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3. Avoid policies with rebates or other return of premium Consider the following two
policies for disability insurance:
annual premium deductible  rebate
policy A   $1000  $600 $0
policy B   $1600  $0 $600
Policy A dominates policy B ﬁnancially:  it costs $600 less, and B only provides the rebate in
case the individual makes no claim during the given period.  (Meanwhile, the holder of A can
earn interest on the $600 that he or she has saved.)  Yet, when the choice between these two
policies was given to a set of subjects in an experiment (Johnson, et al., 1993), a majority chose B
over A. Presumably many of these subjects adopted a goal of maximizing the chance that they
would get a return on their insurance investment.
As noted in the preceding section, there is another reason for avoiding Policy B: the insured
person may decide not to make a justiﬁed claim in order to obtain the rebate. This is a form of
reverse moral hazard for insurance. It defeats the main goal of the insurance.
Emotion-related goals
Emotion-related goals may lead to purchasing ﬁnancially unattractive insurance policies.
Hsee and Kunreuther (2000) tested the following scenario:
You are shipping two vases you purchased for $200 each to your home. Suppose that the
two vases will be packed in the same box so that if one vase is damaged, the other is also
damaged, and if one is not damaged, the other is also not damaged. Of the two vases, you
love one much more than the other. You feel that the vase you love is worth $800 to you
and  the  other  one  is  worth  only  $200  to  you.  Suppose  you  have  the  opportunity  to
purchase shipping insurance and that you have enough money to insure only one vase.
Which one of the two polices will you purchase?
Policy A: The insurance premium for the vase you love is $12.
Policy B: The insurance premium for the vase you don’t love as much is $10.
The decision maker should choose Policy B, because it costs only $10, yet offers exactly the same
ﬁnancial beneﬁt as Policy A. When subjects were asked to make the choices between the two
policies 63.5% of the respondents chose Policy A. Presumably policy A evoked a goal of being
consoled somewhat for the loss of the vase that was loved, or the goal of showing how much one
cares about the loved vase.
Of course, this is a contrived situation, in which there is no real beneﬁt, emotional or
otherwise, to paying $2 extra for the insurance. The more general point is that attachment to
objects,  and  other  sorts  of  emotional  goals,  should  raise  a  ﬂag  for  consideration  as  to  how
important the goals are and what one is really getting from the insurance, in the same way that
violation of the ﬁnancial benchmarks raises a ﬂag.
There are certainly situations where an individual should be willing to violate ﬁnancial
benchmarks to satisfy important emotional goals. Consider the following example.  A couple is
renting a car for a vacation trip and is asked by the rental company whether they want to pay $2
extra per day to avoid paying up to $1000 if they should  have an accident.  The couple can
manage the payment of $1000 if necessary, and the chance of an accident happening on any one
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second  ﬁnancial  benchmark,  they should  take the  $1000  deductible  and  save  $2 per  day.
Suppose, however, that the person arranging for the contract is unable to convince her spouse of
the beneﬁts of following this rule: he will worry much less if they pay the $2 per day for full
coverage.  She will probably conclude that $2 per day is a small price to maintain peace of mind
for her husband and harmony on the vacation.
Consumer education
What should be the outlines of a program of consumer education for insurance? Based on
the  model  of  constructed  choice  that  we  have  dev  eloped  in  this  paper, the  most  appropriate
instructional  strategy  would  focus  on  the  goals  that  underly  consumers’  choices  and  would
highlight features of desirable insurance plans that can achieve those goals that matter most to
each person.
Extend the frame
It seems useful to present competing plans in multiple frames. The most obvious framing
is temporal: a small deductible that generates peace of mind at what seems like a low price for
one  year  looks  much  worse,  as  noted  above, when  the  expense  is  added  up  over ten  years.
Probability of loss is also easier to understand in a longer time frame: a probability of 4% per year
translates into about a 1 in 3 chance of having one or more losses in 10 years, i.e., a 2/3 chance of
no loss at all. Extended temporal framing also has the effect of putting the loss in a long-run
perspective. Paying $1000 out of pocket is very painful for most people, but may seem more
manageable if it happens only once in 10 or 20 years.
Apart  from  temporal  framing,  it  may  make sense  to  broaden  the  frame  of  any single
insurance decision to include other protective needs.  A ﬁnancially unfavorable choice in one
domain, multiplied by 3 or 4 different domains, can seem obviously wrong.
The goal of return on investment may be more resistant to broadening the frame temporally
or  for  other  needs,  since  the  return  is  also  multiplied. Thus,  insurance  needs  to  be  framed
alongside other investments.  Paying $600 extra for a rebate policy, which may or may not bring a
return of $600, seems obviously inferior to investing the $600 in a certiﬁcate of deposit or in
mutual  funds. Such  reframing  is  of  course  only  meaningful  for  those  who  perceive  other
investment opportunities as accessible.
Provide economic incentives
The most obvious economic incentive that could be provided to an individual is a rebate
check: imagine that the person is contacted by his insurance agent, after having purchased a
policy with a low deductible, and urged to increase it to a higher one. The agent could indicate to
him that he would save $100 by converting his policy from a $500 deductible to $1000, and
would be mailed a check for $100 if he decided to do so.
This scenario is of course predicated on the constructive inv  olvement of insurers and agents
in consumer education.
Address emotional concerns
Individuals are likely to buy insurance in order to meet emotion-related goals, such as
achieving peace of mind, avoiding regret, or gaining consolation in case of a loss. One may hope
to point out paths by which they can still meet some of these goals through insurance plans that
are more attractive ﬁnancially. In the example given above under emotion-related goals, it may
not be difﬁcult to convince a person who was willing to pay $12 for an insurance policy on a vaseGoals & Plans, dk/hk July 2006 33
that he loved that he would still be able to gain consolation by only paying $10 to insure the vase
he didn’t love, since the claim would be based on both vases being destroyed simultaneously. The
fact that the person didn’t purchase a policy on the vase he loved would be irrelevant for obtaining
compensation and hence consolation.
It may also be necessary to challenge emotion-related goals. Wanting to avoid regret is
understandable; but once the individual sees clearly that this is what he is doing, he may think it is
not worth the extra money.
Provide instructional material
Understanding  and  use  of  probabilistic  concepts  is  a  modern  development  in  human
reasoning, and is attained only through some combination of formal instruction, casual learning,
and  apprenticeship  experiences.  Nisbett, Krantz,  Jepson  and  Kunda  (1983)  introduced  the
concept  of statistical  heuristics: short-cut  guides  to  reasoning  that  incorporate  some
probabilistic concepts and lead to their use in everyday reasoning. Fong, Krantz and Nisbett
(1986)  showed  substantial  temporary  improvements  in  everyday  probabilistic  reasoning  from
suitably designed instructional modules.  Protective decision making could similarly beneﬁt from
instruction.  In fact, individuals can be aided in their understanding of the functions of insurance
by instructional material (Piao, Krantz & Kunreuther, 2006).
More speciﬁcally, one way to convince people of the importance of Financial benchmark 1
is to provide graphic examples of the importance of having protection against a catastrophic loss
rather than a small loss. A homeowner would be more likely to purchase a policy with coverage
of $150,000 and a $1000 deductible rather than $100,000 policy with a $500 deductible if she
was presented with a clear explanation of the types of tradeoffs that would have to be made in
choosing  between  the  two policies  and  the  impact  to  her  resources  if  a  ﬁre  destroyed  her
$150,000 house and she only had $100,000 worth of insurance.
Take advantage of social settings
There are vast advantages to conducting consumer education in groups, rather than in the
normal  one-on-one  relationship  between  seller  (insurance  agent)  and  prospective  buyer
(policyholder).  Social facilitation increases engagement in learning. People learn even more by
teaching  one  another. Misunderstandings  are  given voice  and  can  more  easily  be  corrected.
Finally, the group conclusions are more readily adopted as social norms.
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